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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the empirical relationships between public capital and aggregate 
economic growth in the United States, allil in particular the question of whether or not public 
capital is productive. It develops a theoretical framework which allows for full consideration 
of feedback among variables without imposing a priori dynamic structural constraints. 
Parameter estimates are obtained through a V ARMA model. This approach departs from the 
current literature, which relies on a single equation approach to estimate production functions 
and implicitly assumes the absence of feedback relations. 
In this paper estimates for the period 1956-1989 suggest that public capital has a 
substantial effect on production as well as on private capital formation and on labor. 
Furthermore, decisions on public capital seem to follow a policy rule that relates the current 
stock of public capital positively with lagged output and negatively with lagged labor. Our 
results are shown to be compatible with different specifications of production functions, in 
which public capital mayor may or may not be present. Therefore, current interpretations of 
the importance ofthe effects of public capital in terms of the size of the estimated parameters 
in a production function framework are not conclusive. 
RESUMEN 
En este artículo se estudian las relaciones empíricas entre el capital público y el crecimiento 
agregado de la econonúa de Estados Unidos. Se desarrolla un marco teórico que permite tener 
en cuenta el conjunto total de relaciones dinámicas entre las variables, sin imponer a priori 
restricciones dinámicas estructurales. Las estimaciones de los parámetros se obtienen a través 
de un modelo ARMA vectorial. Este enfoque difiere del enfoque uniecuacional convencional 
basado en la estimación de funciones de producción y que implicitamente supone la ausencia 
de relaciones de retroalimentación. 
Nuestras estimaciones para el peñodo 1956-1989 sugieren que el capital público tiene un efecto 
substancial sobre la producción, Ja formación bruta de capital privada y el empleo. Además, 
deciSiones sobre el capital público parecen seguir una regla de política que relaciona 
positivamente, el stock corriente de capital público con el producto retardado y negativamente, 
dicho stock con el empleo retardado. 
Porútlimo se muestra como nuestros resultados son compatibles con diferentes especificaciones 
de funciones de producción, en las que el capital público puede o puede no estar presente como 
input. Por consiguiente, las interpretaciones de la importancia de los efectos de capital público 
en ténninos del tamaño de los parámetros estimados en una función de Producción no son 
concluyentes. 
* The first draft of !his paper was comple!ed while !he firstautlmr was visiling UCSD, under a grant from 
Universidad CClmplutense - Becas Del Amo. We wish to thank Clive Granger, Jim Hamil!on, Alfonso Novales, 
Teodosio Perez, Valerie Ramey, Jim Rauch. and Art Treadway for ve¡y helpful comments and suggestions, and 
Norman Morin for editorial assistant. · 
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Public Capital and Aggregate Growth in the United States: 
Is Public Capital Productive? 
l. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis o{ the empirical ~elatio~hip~ 
between public capital and aggregate growth in the United States, and in particular to 
establish whether or not public capital is productive. The issue of the possible effects of 
public capital on private output is currently at the center of the political debate in the 
US. 
It has been suggested that the American economy is sta.gnating on a crumbling 
infrastructure base. In fa.et, between 1960 and 1991 1 federal public investments in the U.S. 
decreased from 2.3% oí the GDP to just 13 and are currently well below the levels of 
public investment in the European Community, at 3.3, Germany, at 2.43, and Japan, at 
33, of the respective GDPs. In part reflecting this view of the state of the U.S. economy, 
the commitrnent to developing and expanding the network of public capital as a central 
feature of an economic package to promote long term growth has been a tradernark of the 
Clinton Administration. 
The issue of the ernpirical evaluation of the effects of public capital on output 
growth, Le., of whether or not public capital is productive1 has been brought to the 
limelight by the_ seminal work of Aschauer (1989a, 1989b), Munnell (1990) and Munnell 
with Cook (1990). 1/ In their work, investment in public capital has beén suggested as a 
powerful instrument to promote economic growth, and, in particular, the decline in 
infrastructure investment in the last two decades has been identified as a majar culprit far 
the decline in productivity. More recent contributions have challenged these views (see for 
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e.x.ample Aaron, 1990, Eberts, 1990, Hulten and Schwab, 1991, Jorgenson, 1991, and 
Tatom, 1991). 
The debate on whether or not public capital is productive has focused on the size of 
the elasticity of output with respect to public capital as implied by estima.tes of static 
production functions contemporaneously relating labor, priva.te capital, and public capital 
to output. 2/ If the elasticity is zero it is said that public capital has no effect on 
production. If the elasticity is significantly different from zero then public capital is said to 
affect output, Le. to be productive. 
The issue has been addressed in the context of aggregate output in the U.S. (see far 
example Aschauer, 1989a, 1989b, Munnell, 1990a, and Holtz-Eakin, 1988), at the state 
level, at the industry level, or at both levels, in the U.S. (see íor example Costa et aL, 
1987, Duffy-Deno and Eberts, 1991, Garcia-Mila and ÑlcGuire, 1992, Holtz-Eakin, 1992, 
Hulten and Schwab, 1992, and Ñlunnell, 1990b ), and in the context of aggregate 
international comparisons (see Barro, 1991, Berndt and Hansson1 1991, Ford and Poret, 
1991, Shah, 1992, and Baffes and Shah, 1992). 
No clear conclusions arise from the literature. No agreement has been reached as to 
the importance of public capital, i.e., the size and significance oí the associated coefficient. 
The estimated elasticities Range from .39 in Aschauer {1989a) to .03 in Eberts (1990) and 
zero in Tatom (1991} (see fvlunnell, 1992, for details). 
In this paper we argue that the íocus of the debate on the size of elasticities 
obtained from single equation estimates is not adequate to provide a conclusive answer to 
the question of WhethetjJ~r not public capitaf is productive. This is beca~se the single 
equation frame\Vork excludes the'likely presenCe of dynamic feedbacks amOng the relevant 
variables. This is ofparani.ount hnportance--SínCe iffeedbackS-eXist, the Size of the 
elasticity-of output-With<res·pecL-to--P-Uhlfb>Caj>rt:a_i- iÍ!fODtihféd-fiOm a single equation 
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In fact, a zero elasticity with respect to public capital is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for public capital to have no effect on output. lndeed, public capital can affect 
output directly, i.e., asan additional input in the production function1 ar indirecdy 
through capital and labor. At the same time, output can also affect labor as well as private 
and public capital. Finally, labor and private_ capital formation can affect public-capital 
formation. The final effect of public capital on output is the result of a di~ect effect and 
many indirect effects. If feedback relationships do exist among output, labor, prívate and 
public capital, then the single equation approach is misleading and a multivariate 
stochastic approach is required. 
In this paper we address the issue of whether or not public capital is productive in a 
a theoretical framework which allows far fully consideration of feedbacks among output, 
labor, prívate and public capital, without imposing a priori structural constraints on the 
dynamic relationships arnong these variables. 
The multivariate stochastic frarnework is particularly appropriate far dealing with 
other technical problems previously recognized in the literature (see Munnell (1992) and 
Tatom (1991) far a comprehensive discussion of these problems). The main criticisms 
come in terms of the econometric specification of the production function (the same 
criticisms would apply to a cost function approach). First, labor and private capital inputs 
are endogenous variables which generate simultaneous equation biases and invalidate OLS 
estimates. Second, statistical properties of the different time series have been ignored, Le., 
non-stationarity and the possible existence oí cointegration among the variables. Third, 
the issue of reverse causality, Le., the possibility that output may be causing public capital 
and not the oth-er way around, has not been conclusively addressed. 
In this paper we use aggregate U.S. data3/ far private output, labor1 private capital, 
and public capital far the period 1956-1989. The theoretical model is e~timated using a 
y ARMA model. Estimates suggest that public capital have a substa.ntial effect on long 
term productíon as well as on private capital íormation and labor, implyong that public 
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capital is productive. Furthermore, decisions on public capital seem to follow a policy rule 
that relates the current stock of public capital positively with lagged output and negatively 
with lagged labor. Finally, our results of strong long term effects of public capital on 
production are shown to be compatible, under different assumptions on the 
contemporaneous effects among variables, with different specifications oí production 
functions in which public capital mayor may not be present. Therefore
1 
we claim that 
current interpretations of the importance of the effects of public capital in terms oí the size 
of the estimated parameter in a production function are not conclusive. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2. we present the 
theoretical model. In Section 3. we report and analyze the empirical results, including the 
study of the effects of public capital through orthogonalized impulse--response functions. 
Finally, in Section 4. we provide concluding remarks and suggestions far future work. 
2; Theoretical Framework 
We propase a conceptual model for the treatment of the effects of public capital on 
the performance of the economy (see Treadway, 1986, and Flores, 1990, far early 
applications of this type of conceptual framework). The theoretical framework is designed 
to minimize the number of assumptions and to achieve the greatest degree of generality. 
Accordingly, the theoretical model has a number of desirable characteristics. First, the 
. / 
model is presente~Jas a multivariate time series model. This facilitates ~he integration of 
,, 
basic economic theory concepts into a statistical framework. Second, it does not impose a 
priori restrictions on the dynamic relations among the different variables. In particular, it 
a11ows for feedbacks between output, labor and private capital, and public capital 
(exogeneity of public capital is not imposed), and among output, labor and private capital. 
Third, it requires minimal structural assurnptíons in arder to study the effects of public 
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. u1 · t does not require 
. .tal formation. In part1c ar, l t labor and pnvate cap1 
capital on outpu • , h h it may be compatible 
. . ·fication of any production íunct1on, even t oug 
the a pnon spec1 _ : 
with different specifications. . tematic way some oí t~e 
. ulation allows us to address in a sys 
Moreover, this forro d eneity of private capital 
. us em irical literature, namely the en og 
criticisms oí the previo p . d the possibility oí reverse 
f arity oí the different vanables, an and labor' the non-sta ion 
tto public capital. causation from outpu 
2 1 TheModel · h e 
. . 1 t we cons1der t e sam bli ital íormation on ou pu ' 
To address the impact of pu c cap . t y labor L prívate 
. . bles as in the previous literature, i.e., outpu t' ti 
type oí econom1c vana 1 denote the logarithmic rate 
. ·tal PK (hereafter, lower case etters 
capital Kt, and pubhc cap1 t . y· the private sector and 
We assume that there are two sectors in the econom . . 
of change). . h ha.ve control over d1fferent 
two sectors are different in that t ey ' 
the public sector. The d k or in vector notation zt = (y t lt kt) ' 
variables. The private sector controls yt' lt' an t' 
while the public sector determines pkt. . d blic sector variables. 
. he behavior oí both pnvate an pu 
Let us cons1der now t d k using information on 
- S tor -The priva te sector determines Y t' lt, an t' . 
Pnvate ec f k Mathematically, th1s 
al f all the variables as weU as the current value o p t" past v ues o 
¡ 11 ·ng wav· can be expressed in the o ow1 •. 
(!) z = v (B) pkt + t:zt 
t ' 
7rz(B) t:zt = ªzt 
where, 
v (B) = (v (B) "1(B) vk(B))' 
z y . 'th 
ís a 3" 1 vector of stable transfer funct1ons w1 
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11/B) = vjO + 11j1B + vj2B
2+ ... 1 for j = y1 l, ki 
fzt = ( fyt flt fkt)' is a 3x 1 noise vector; 
1í2 {B} = l-1f1B -1í2B
2 
- ... is a 3x3 polynomial rnatrix with íf¡ as lag-i coefficient 
matrices (the roots of the determinant oí 11"z(B) must lie on or outside the unit circle)¡ and 
ªzt = (ayt a11 ªkt)' is a 3xl white noise vector with contemporaneous covariance 
matrix E
2
. 
Public Sector-The public sector determines pk1, using information about the past 
values of all the variables. Mathematically, this can be ex.pressed in the following way; 
(2) pkt = vp(B)'t + 'pt 
~P(B) 'pt = ªpt 
vp(B) = (vpy(B) vp1(B) vpk(B)), is a 1><3 vector oí stable transfer functions, 
fpt is a noise scalar, 
11" (B) = I-11" 1B - ~ 2B2 - ... , has roots on or outside the unit circle, and p p p 
ªpt is a white noise scalar with variance a~. 
Notice that, if the public sector <loes not use information on the previous values of 
the private sector vari~bles, no feedback rules exist and public capital is truly an exogenous 
,? 
variable. 
2.2 Basic Assumptions 
In the model formulation there are two basic assumptions which we will call 
asymmetry and independence. These assumptions jointly represent sufficient condition far 
the parameters of the theoretical model to be exactly identified. 
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Assumption 1 - Asymmetry 
Let n and n be the information sets of the private and public sectors at t. 
zt pt 
These sets can be defined as follows: 
n.1 = { 't-i' pkt-f pkt }, i = i, 2, .. 
n 1 = { ,1 ., pk1 .¡, i = 1, 2, .. p -J -J 
This assumption can be interpreted as follows. First, _both the private and the, 
public sectors are assumed to know at the beginning of the period ali the past values oí all 
the variables determined in both sectors. Empirical results will determine whether or not 
this ínformation has been used by either the private or the public sectors ín their decision 
making. 
Second, the prívate sector knows the current values of public capital while the 
public sector does not know the current values oí the variables determined in the private 
sector, hence the term asymmetry to describe this assumption. This assumption is 
consistent with the observation that the public sector, through the.bureaucratic budgetary 
process announces in advance, Le., at the beginning of the period, what public capital 
e."<penditures will be during the period. Therefore, the iníormation oí public capital 
forrnation íor the period is available when the private sector makes its decisions. 
Furthermore, since public capital decisions are announced at the beginning of the period, 
current realizations of the private sector variables cannot be in the inforrnation set of the 
public sector. 
Third, the private sector clearly has information about the plans for public capital 
formation annOunced in the beginning ofthe period by the public sector. There is a 
question as to how accurately the public sector plans are expected to be implemented, and 
in general as to whether or not the private sector actually uses this information. Our 
strategy is to allow the data to tell us whether or not information on the current levels of 
public capital is actually used by the private sector. Alternatively, current information 
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could be excluded a priori and symmetry assumed. This would be, in our judgment 
unnecessarily restrictive. 
Assumption 2 - Independence 
Let a a1 ªk and a be the white noise residuals associated with the equations yt• t' t' pt 
for output, labor, private capital, and public capital, respectively. We assume that 
ªpt is independent from ªyt' ªlt' and 31ct· 
This independence assumption postula.tes that random shocks in the evolution of 
public capital are independent from shocks in the variables determined in the priva.te sector 
(notice that random shocks in the priva.te sector, ªyt' ªIt• and ªkt' are assumed to be 
contemporaneously correlated). The assumption of independence is directly related to the 
separation of the priva.te and public sectors. lndeed, it is not possible to talk about two 
separate sectors with different tasks unless we also assume that the sector-specific shocks 
are independent. In particular, it implies that the public sector has full discretionary 
control over pkt. 
It can be argued that omitted variables and measurement errors can result in 
contemporaneously correlated structural shocks. Assuming conternporaneously correlated 
structural shocks leads to identification problems which are often solved by imposing a 
priori constraints on the parameters of the structural model, usually on the dynamic 
structure. However, t,his assumption not only does not solve the problems with omitted 
variables and measu~ment errors but also comes at a cost of imposing a priori constraints 
in the dynamics of the model. Such an alternative would be particularly inadequate in the 
context of our model, since the objective of the paper is to study the dynamic relationships 
among variables. 
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2.3 Impulse-Response Functions 
We are now interested in considering the reaction of prívate sector variables to a 
shock in pkt. From equations (1) and (2), we can express zt as 
(3) 
where, 
(4) 
(5) 
The sequence oí coefficients associated with the lag polynomial 111 P(B) is to be 
interpreted as the orthogonalized impulse-response function of zt versus ªpt' i.e., 
{)z ¡ aa 1 . far j=O, 1, 2, This function gives the response of zt+j to a unitary change t p -J 
1n a . It identifies the dynarnic consequences for the prívate sector variables if the public pi 
sector were to change pkt, in a 1narginal and transitory fashion, beyond what is implied by 
the estimated rule of behavior for pkt in (2). This is a key far describing the effects of 
public capital upon the performance of the prívate sector 
Notice that by Assumption 2 ªpt is independent from the shocks in (1). Therefore1 
the impulse-response function of zt versus ªpt does not depend on the contemporaneous 
correlations among the variables in zt. Thus, in arder to study the effec~s oí changes in pkt 
on zt' it is not necessary to specify a whole structural equations model and the model given 
by (1) and (2) with the underlying assumptions is all that is needed. 
Additionally, one may be interested in considering the effects of shocks to kt and lt 
on y t· As in the case of shocks to pkt, the study of these effects requires the use of 
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orthogonalized impulse-response functions. The residuals in ªzt are assumed to be 
contemporaneously correlated. Therefore, 11' z(B) does not ha ve the same interpretation as 
1llp(B). An orthogonalization of the residuals ªzt is necessary befare the individual effects 
from each shock can be disentangled and the orthogonalized impulse-response function can 
be obtained. 
2.4 Estimation Strategy 
Notice that by Assumption 1, v (B), v 1(B), and v k(B) are such that v 0 = py p p py 
v plO = v pkO = O, so that current values of zt do not affect pkt, and that by Assumption 2, 
ªpt is independent from ªyt' ªIt' ªkt. 
The model (1)-(2) together with Assumptions 1 and 2 can be written in matrix 
formas ílw(B) '"'t = ªwt with I: as the matrix of contemporaneous correlations of ªwt' or: 
[ 
>a(B) 
-1fp(B) Vp(B) 
-»(8) v,.(B)J [ª' l = [ª"] 
1íp{B) pkt ªpt 
(6) 
(7) 
The multivariate stochastic model (6) is not normalized to have ITw(O) = I. Rather, 
(8) 
where vzO = (vyO v10 vko)' is the vector of contemporaneous effects of pkt on zt. 
Premultiplying (6) by v-l we can obtain the normalized multivariate stochastic 
model 
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(9) 
where, 
n;(B) = v-1nw(B), 
* -1 
ªwt =V ªwt· 
• • The matóx oí contemporaneous covariances oí ªwt is·l: , which is given by: 
(10) 
The model in (9) and (10) is a general multívariate stochastic model. A V ARMA 
representation oí this model can be constructed from the available data using the 
methodology developed by Tiao and Box (1981) and Jenkins and Alavi (1981). Consider 
the estimated version of (9) and (10). From (10) we can estimate V, since vzO can be 
obtained by multiplying partition (1,2) by 1/~~. Once V has been obtained, it is possible 
to estimate Ilw(B) by premultipling the estimated version oí (9) by V. 
3. Empiócal Analysis 
3.1 Data: sources and description 
The data set used in this paper is obtained from Ford and Poret (1991). The data 
covers the sample period oí 1956 to 1989, and therefore contains 34 yearly observations (see 
Appendix). Private output and (gross) private capital stock both measured in billion 1982 
dollars, as well as employment measured in ten-thousand workers, are obtained from the 
OECD Analytical Data Base. 
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The (gross) public capital stock, also measured in billion 1982 dolla:rs, is obtained 
from OECD Flow and Stock of Fixed Capital. Public capital is defined as the capital stock 
of 11producers of government services11 , a definition clase to the concept of public capital in 
Aschauer (1989a, 1989b). 
Public capital in.eludes Federal, state ,and local government .capital goods. It 
includes: core infrastructure; buildings and equipment; and, conservation and 
development structures (in 1989 these three categories comprise approximately 63.43, 
28.43, and 8.23 oftotal public capital, respectively). Core infrastructure includes 
highways, streets and roads, mass transit, airport facilities, electric, gas and water supply 
facilities and distribution systems, and sewer facilities. In turn, buildings and equipment 
refer to activities like education, hospital, police, fire, justice1 and administration. Our 
definition of public capital does not include: private buildings and equipment in transport 
and communications; private buildings and equipment in electricity, gas, and water; and, 
military capital stock. 
3_2 Estimation results and d.iagnostic tests 
The univariate analyses of the d.ifferent series (see Box and Jenkins, 1976), which 
are not presented here, suggest that lnYand lnL are I(l) while lnK and lnPK are 1(2) 
Nevertheless, the univariate analysis applied to the variables ln(L/Y), ln(K/Y) and 
ln(PK/Y) suggests that these variables are I(l). These results cast doubts on the arder of 
integration of variables lnK and lnPK. In fact, if In Y, ln(K/Y), and ln(PK/Y) are truly 
1(1) this implies that \hK and lnPK are also 1(1). 
In arder to decide on the arder of integration of the variables we test the null 
hypothesis of an extra unit root on the rates of growth y, l-y1 k-y, and pk-y, through the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-test. The results of the test are reported in Table l. 
The first column shows the values of the ADF t-test from a regression of the left-hand 
side variable versus this variable lagged one year, whlle the second column shows the 
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values oí the ADF t-test írom a regression oí the left-hand sirle variable versus this 
variable lagged one year and its first difference. 
In all cases the value of the ADF t-test is lower than the 53 critica! value1 which is 
-3. Therefore, the null hypothesis of an ex:tra unit root is rejected for all the variables. 
Accordingly, the variables In Y, In(L/Y), ln(K/Y), and ln(PK/Y) are!(!) and therefore 
lnY, lnL, lnK, and lnPK are also 1(1). 
In order to investigate the ex:istence oí cointegration among In Y 1 lnL, lnK, and 
lnPK, (see Granger, 1981, 1986, and Engle and Granger, 1987), the ADF t-test was 
applied to the residuals (r r 'k r ) from the regressions in log--l.evels of each variable yt lt t pt 
on the remaining variables. The results are sho\'(n in Table 2. The columns of this table 
show the ADF t-test values with one, two, three, and four lags of the first difference oí the 
left-hand side variable. 
In ali cases the value oí the t-statistic is larger than the 53 critical value, i.e. 
-4.71, which means that the null hypothesis oí a unit root in the residuals cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, there is no evidence of cointegration among these variables. 
Now that we have determined that ali the variables have the sarne arder oí 
integration and there are no relations oí cointegration, we can develop a multivariate 
stochastic model free of any cointegration constraints. Following the methodology in Tiao 
and Box (1981) and Jenkins and Ala vi (1981) ~ V AR(l) specification was selected from the 
class of V ARMA models as the most adequate representatíon of the correlation structure in 
the data set. The estimated system corresponding to (9) is (standard deviations are shown 
ln parenthesis): 
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1-1.048 l.36B -.64B ' o 
' (.22) (.29) ( .17) ' 
' 
' 
' -.878 l+.828 -.72B ' .66B 
' (.18) (.25) ( .17) 
' 
( .14) 
' 
' '• ªYt (9') ' -.188 .13B l-.90B 
' 
o 
' 1, •• (.04) (.os) ( .03) 
' lt 
' 
' 
'• •ki ' 
-------------+--- -pkt-- -ª~k~-
-.05B .OSB o :i-.968 
( .02) (.03) 
' ( .02) 
' 
In turn, the estimated matrix of contemporaneous correlations, R is 
.84 .80 : .06 
(10') R = • 
. 84 .88 : -.23 
' 
.80 .88 1 : -.24 
---+--
.06 -.23 -.24 l 
The likelihood ratio test of over-identifying restrictions in (9'), which is distributed 
as a x2(3), assumes the value 2.15. This shows that the zero constraints in (9') are 
adequate. 
The contemporaneous correlations between the error term in the equation for public 
capital and the error terms in the other equations are very small. Given their standard 
deviation of .175 they are not statistically different from zero. This irnplies vzO =O, which 
means that the private sector does not use contemporaneous information on the public 
capital in its decision ~aking (see section 2.4 above). Accordingly, the data suggests a 
.# 
symmetric use of info{.mation. Recall that, for the sake oí generality, Assumption 1 
allowed for asymmetric information sets. 
The diagnostic tests on the residuals of {9') are shown below in Table 3 The values 
for the means and standard deviations suggest that the means are not statistically different 
from zero. The autocorrelation function up to lag four together with the Box-Pierce 
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statistic indicates a white noise structure. The ARCH ):2-tests indicates the absence of 
conditional heteroskedasticity. Finally, the Jarque-Bera x2-tests suggests normality of 
the resíduals. 
The cross correlation functions among residuals up to arder four, which are not 
shown in this table, are not statistically different from zero, which indicates the absence of 
additional structure. Nevertheless, as an overparameterization ex.ercise a V AR(2) 
specification was estimated. No estimated parameter associated to lags of order two was 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
In order to investigate the robustness of the estimated model, we re-estimate the 
VAR(l) model without the last five observations The estimation results are reported 
below . 
1-I.04B 1. 44B -.62B o 
( .23) ( .31) ( .18) 
-.868 l+.808 -.66B .61B 
(.20) (.26) (.18) ( .14) 
,, 
ªYt (9") -.18B .12B 1-. 90B o 
'• •' (.04) (.05) (.03) 
' 
1 t 
' k, a¡, 
-------------+.--- -pkl-- -ª~k~ -
-.058 .06B o : 1-. 96B 
1 .03) (.03) ' ( .02) 
' 
As can be seen from a cursory inspection of (9') and (9"), variations in the 
estimated parameters are negligible. The Chow test of parameter stability distributed as 
F(20,24) assum.es the value 1.44 which implíes that the null hypothesis ofparameter 
constancy cannot be rejected at the 53 significance .tevel. Also, we perform an 
out-of-the--sample forecasting exercise to investígate the forecasting ability of the model 
for the period 1985-1989. The curnulative x2{20)/20 test for an horizon of five years has a 
value of 1.6, which by being lower than 2. indicates a good performance of the estirnated 
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model. The x2{4)/4 test for one-period ahead forecast is .581 which indicates that the 
model performs especially "':'ell far one-period forecasts. These statistics confirm the 
stability of parameter estimates. 
3.3 Interpretation of the empirical results 
Using the theoretical model in Section 2, and the empirical estimates as reported in 
Section 3.2 we are now in a position to analyze the nature of the relationship between 
public capital and the private sector variables. 
Estimation results suggest that public capital cannot be considered an exogenous 
variable. In fact, the growth rate oí public capital is positively related to the growth rate 
of output lagged one period and negatively related to the growth rate of labor lagged one 
period. This can be interpreted as a policy rule for public capital which associates decisions 
on the evolution of public capital to the performance of the economy in the previous 
period 
Public capital grows faster if output has increased faster in the previous years. 
Intuitively, greater output leads to greater availability of funds through the taxation 
mechanisms and therefore to greater public investment. This result confirms sorne cl.Ums 
in the literature (see 1\'Iunnell, 1992) on the possibility oí reverse causation. Furthermore, 
public capital grows faster if labor demand has increased more slowly. Intuitively, public 
investment has been used as a countercyclical tool in what refers to the evolution of the 
labor markets. 
. " . 
The effects of o,tJ:tput and labor on public capital formation, taken together, con:firm 
~ -
the conjecture in Ford and Poret (1991) that public capital seems to respond to labor 
productivity with a lag. Finally, it should be noted that we could not find any lagged 
feedback from prívate capital to public capital. 
Let us now consider the effects of shocks in the policy rule for public capital 
formation on the evolution of the prívate sector variables. The response of private sector 
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variables to public capital is not instantaneous, but rather subject to a one-year lag. This 
comes from the fact that the estimated coefficients of v20 are zero. This means that the 
private sector does not seem to make immediate use of the inform_ati9n on the public sector 
decisions. Intuitively, the private sector waits until the public investment pi~ h~ve been 
carried out, which takes place during the budget year. This is consistent with sorne oí the 
observations ín the literature that no one would expect the evolution in public capital in 
one year to be correlated with the evolution of outpu.t in the same year (see Munnell, 
1992) 
The effects on the private sector variables of a one percentage point change in the 
rate of growth of public capital is given by (3). See Figure 1 for a depiction of the 
impulse-response functions for the rate of growth oí output, labor and private capital. 
In the very short~run, the impulse-response functions suggést that the rate of 
growth of output and private capital are relatively rigid and that an increase in the rate of 
growth oí public capital tends to reduce, temporarily, the rate o{ growth of the labor input. 
However after this initial reaction the effects of the original change in policy rule are 
consistently positive. The positive effects on the private sector variables reach a peak 
within the first twenty years. After this point, the rates of change of the prívate sector 
variables slo,vly converge to their initial position (zero). 
It should be pointed out that the convergence back to the initial position is very 
slow For example, one hundred years after the original shock, the rate of growth of output 
¡5 still over .2 percentage points above the original state. In fact, values arbitrarily clase to 
the original position are oÍlly reached after a period of two hundred years. This refiects a 
great degree of inei:tia in the system. This inertia is explained by the fact that changes in 
the evolution of public capital affect the private sector variables, and changes in the 
pri vate sector variables ín turn feeds back in to the evolution of public capital formation. 
The response of the private sector growth to a shock in the rate of g"rowth of public 
capital can also be measured in terms of the levels of the priva.te sector"Variables. See 
-1 
¡i 
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Figure 2. In particular, a temporary positive shock in the rate of growth public capital has 
permanent positive effects on the levels of ali priva.te sector variables. 
A one percentage point temporary shock in the growth rate of public capital, i.e. 1 a 
permanent shock of one percentage point in the level of public capital, induces after a 
ten-year period a change oí 7.4 percentage points in the level oí output, 3.8 percentage 
points in the leve! oí prívate capital, and 1.3 percentage points in the leve! of labor. In the 
long-run (after a two-hundred year periód), the effects on the levels of output, private 
capital and labor are 55.7, 60.8 and 30.2 percentage points, respectively. It can be said 
that w hile the effects of pk are slow in coming they are al so longlasting. 
The effects of a positive shock in pk are systematically greater on output than on 
labor, Le., they increase the average labor productivity. Accordingly, our results are 
consistent with the view that a slowdown in infrastructure íormation (a negative shock) is 
at least partly responsible far the decline in the growth of labor productivity in the Iast few 
decades (see Aschauer, 1989a). 
3.4 On the Terms of the CUirent Debate: Competing Production Function 
l 
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Following Flores {1990) and Flores and Pereira (1992) this matrix can be interpreted as 
reflecting intra-period effects. In this section we use sorne examples of diagonalization 
using triangular transformation matrices to illustrate the basic point oí this section. 
Let us consider a standard view of the production process. Assume that private 
capital is rigid in the short-run. Then, the level of private capital and desired output 
determine labor demand. In this case the diagonalizati9n matrix can be obtained from: 
(11) '1t = .30 ªyt + 2.56 ªkt + "1t 
ªyt = 4.60 ªkt + uyt 
ªkt = ukl. 
or in matrix forro 
(12) 
-.30 1 -2.56 o --4.... º:l] 
o 
o 
o 
o 
= 
Specifications where the numbers are OLS estimates using the residuals from (9') as variables. By 
The debate on the effects of public capital on output has centered on the size of the 
elasticity of output with respect to public capital as implied by the estimates from a 
production function. If the elasticity is zero it is said that public capital has no effect on 
production. If the elasticity is significantly different from zero then public capital is said to 
• 
' affect output. VVe havelfargued that) in the presence of feedbacks, a zero elasticity of 
. . 
output with respect to public capital is neither necessary nor sufficient far public capital to 
ha.ve no effect on output. This is the basic point of this section. 
The statistical results detailed above are consistent with different production 
function specifications. The different specifications arise from the specifics of the 
diagonalization of the n1atrix of contemporaneous correlations.among the residuals of (9'). 
construction the new vector of residuals (uyt "It "kt upt)' has a diagonal contemporaneous 
variance-covariance matrix. The coefficient matrix in (12) is the diagonalization matrix. 
Premultipling (9') by the diagonalization matrix above, we obtain: 
(13) (l-.21B) y1 = -.76B lt + (4.60-3.50B) k1 + "yt 
(14) (!+.OSB) lt = (.30 +.!OB) Y¡+ (2.56-l.78B) k1 - .66B pk1 + ult 
(15) (l-.90B) k1 = .ISB Y¡ - .13B 11 + ukt 
(16) (l-.96B) pkt = .05B y1 - .05B 11 + upt 
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From ( 15) one can obtain as a long term relationship among rates oí growth ( which 
are !(O) variables) 
(17) y=.72l+.56k. 
This suggests that in the long run y is determined by l and k. Furthermore, giveli. 
the standard deviation associated to the elements of (9') the hypothesis of the sum of the 
two coefficients being one cannot be rejected at the 53 level of significance. In this case 
our results are compatible with a Cobb-Douglas production function in growth rates which 
displays constant returns to scale on the two private inputs and which does not include 
public capital. 
The existence of constant returns to scale on private inputs leads to the 
indeterminacy of output size1 which is determined in the demand sirle of the economy. 
Therefore equations (13) and (14) can be interpreted as yielding implicitly the 
cost-minimizing input demand functions in growth rates. Notice finally that equation (16) 
reflects the policy rule for public capital which is invariant to the choice of diagonalization 
matrix. 
If one were to estimate a production function and were to obtain (17), the 
conclusion would be that changes in public capital would lead to no long term changes in 
output. In fact, (17) is rernarkably similar to the estimates in Tatom (1991)-
Let us conside1inow a similar set of beliefs on the production process. Assume that 
. il 
priva te capital is rigicf' in the very short-run. However, now the levels 9f private capital 
and labor determine output. In this case the diagonalization matrix can be obtained from: 
(ll') ªyt = .75 •¡, +!.66 ªkt + "yt 
ªIt = 3.93 ªkt + ult 
ªkt = ukt 
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or in matrix forro 
-.75-1.66 ~] ªyt ""] (12') o -3.93 ªlt u_lt o o t ªkt kt o o o ªpt "pt 
where the corresponding contemporaneous variance--cova.riance rnatrix of the residuals is 
diagonal. 
(13') 
(14') 
(15) 
(16) 
Premultipling (9') by the diagonalization matrix in (12'), we obtain: 
(l-.09B) Yt = (.75-.53B)1 -+ (166-!.39B) k + 49B pk +u t t' tyt 
(1+ 31B) lt = (3.93 +.16B) y -2 82B k - 66B pk +u t . t . t lt 
(1-.90B) k1 = .18B y1 - .13B lt + ukt 
(l-.96B) pkt = .05B Yt - .05B 11 + upt 
From (13') one can obtain as a long term relationship among growth rates 
(17') y= 241+.30k+ 54pk. 
This suggests that, in the long run, y is determined by 1, k, and pk. Furthermore, 
the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of !, k, and pk is one cannot be rejected at 
the 53 level of significance. Accordingly, our results are compatible with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function which displays decreasing returns to scale in labor ~d private capital, 
but which displays constant returns to scale when public capital is also included. 
Since the production function displays decreasing returns to scale in the private 
inputs, output level is well determined in a: standard profit maximization problem and the 
long-term versions of (13') and (14') can be interpreted as the first order conditions far a 
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profit maximization problem, implicitly giving the optirnal demands for labor and private 
capital in growth rates. Again notice that (16) reflects the invaríant policy rule for public 
capital. 
If one were to estimate a production function and were to obtain (17'}, the 
conclusion would be that a permanent one-percentage point increase in rate of growth of 
public capital would lead to a long term increase of .54 percentage points in the rate of 
growth of output. In fact, the elasticity estimates in (17') are remarkably similar to the 
elasticity estimates in Aschauer (1989a). 
The basic point illustrated by the examples above is that the substantial effects of 
public capital on output are consistent with production function specifications in which 
public capital mayor may not enter. This suggests that the debate is not well framed in a 
production function framework with a single equation approach. 
In the literature, public capital has been seen as affecting private sector performance 
in two different ways. First, public capital may be seen asan input to the production 
process, the so called direct effect. Second, public capital may affect output by affecting 
the marginal productivity of the private inputs capital and labor, the so called indirect 
effects. See Hui ten and Schwab (1991) far a detailed discussion oí these effects. 
Our methodology allows us to identify the total effect oí public capital on output, 
i.e., the sum of the direct and indirect effects as defined above. Far the sake oí 
comparability with the literature we calculate the effect on the long run growth rate of 
output of a permanent .óne-percentage point change in the rate of growth of public capital 
formation. ThiS long jtn elasticity is .99.4/ This result is consistent with the values 
obtained by Baxter and King (1993). In the context of a representative agent growth 
model they show that a unit increase in public investment spending may result in long-run 
output multipliers in excess of unity. 
To decompose the effects of changes in public capital on output in direct and 
indirect effects, we need a structural specification. The examples above, however, illustrate 
_i __ 
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that this decomposition depends on one's beliefs on the instantaneous correlations among 
the variables. In equation (17) the direct effect is zero, while in (17') the direct effect is 
positive, and seems to be much larger than the effects of private capital or labor (see 
Aschauer 1989a, and Munnell1 1992 ). In both cases, however, the total ~ffect oí public 
capital on output is not captured within a single equation estimation procedure. 
4. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This paper deals with the empirical relationship between public capital and 
aggregate economic growth in the United States, and in particular on the question of 
whether or not public capital is productive. It develops a theoretical íramework which 
allows far full consideration oí feedbacks among the relevant variables without imposing a 
priori dynamic structural constraints. This approach departs from the previous empirical 
literature which relied both on the use of a single equation approach to estímate production 
functions and implicitly on the absence oí feedback relations. 
Estimates for the period 1956-1989 suggest that public capital have a substantial 
effect on long term production as well as on private capital formation and labor, i.e., public 
capital is productive. The effects are particularly strong within the first twenty years and 
are longlasting. Also, the effects seem to be particularly strong on private capital 
formation and less so on labor. Finally, decisions on public capital seem to follow a policy 
rule that relates the rate of growth of current public capital stock with the growth rates of 
lagged output (positively) and lagged labor (negatively). 
We have also shown that our results of strong long term effects of public capital on 
production are compatible, under different assumptions on the contemporaneous effects 
among variables, with different specifications of production functions, in which public 
capital may or.may not be present. Therefore, Current interpretations in the literature of 
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the importance of the effects of public capital in terms of the size of the estimated 
parameter in a production function are not conclusive. 
The analysis in this paper could be extended in different directions. First, and 
consistent with the existing literature, befare one could recommend that public capital 
formation should be soundly established in the center stage of any long term growth 
package, the approach developed in this paper should be applied to disaggregated 
state/industry data, to other historical periods in the U.S., as well as to other countries at 
a different stage of development. 
Second, the discussion of the effects of shocks to public capital on the prívate sector 
variables should be seen as the prelUde to the study oí the comparative effects of shocks to 
public capital1 private capital1 and to labor on output. After all 1 the crucial policy 
question is what the use of the marginal dallar should be. Just showing that public capital 
is important in the gro,vth process1 i.e. 1 it is productive1 does not ímply that the best 
growth strategy should involve massive public capital formation and not incentives to 
private investment and/or labor formation. 
Third, there is the outstanding question of how public capital formation would be 
financed. One can think of financing public capital formation through taxation 1 money 
creation or public debt. Each of these different financing mechanisms is likely to generate 
negative effects which rnay, at least partially, neutralize positive effects of infrastructures. 
In this sense our estimates of the effects oí positive shocks are to be interpreted as upper 
bounds of the possibl(f/actual effects. 
'f. 
L 
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Footnotes 
1/ The issue of the effects of public capital-on economic performance has long received 
the attention of the economics profession. See earlier contríbutions in Arrow and Kurz 
(1970) and Diewert (1986). See also the recent theoretical contributions of Barro (1990) 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) in the context of the literature on endogenous growth. 
2/ In most cases a Cobb-Douglas production function specification is followed. See 
Costa et aL, 1987, and Eberts, 1990, far the use oí translog production functions and 
Berndt and Hansson, 1991, for the use of dual cost functions. 
3/ "Vhile there are certain disadvantages from an aggregated approach, in particular in 
-which respects policy recommendations, there is a fundamental question of whether or not 
the state/industry levels are wide enough to allow the internalization oí the spillover 
benefits generated by public capital formation. Maybe for this very reason, the 
overwhelming majority of studies that suggest the irrelevance of public capital formation 
are disaggregated in nature. 
4/ It should be noted that the computation of the effects of permanent changes in the 
growth rate oí public ca¡pital, i.e., the computation of conventional long-run multipliers is 
i 
not, strictly speaking, /~onsistent with our estimates and is only offered to allow tentative 
comparisons. In fact, the estírnated parameters, and in particular, the feedback from the 
private sector to the public sector, preclude any consideration of public capital asan 
exogenous variable. Rather, public capital follows a well---defined policy-rule. A 
permanent change in the evolution of public capital formation is only meaningful if public 
capital were to be found exogenous. 
1 
1 
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Table 1 -Testing for Unit Roots 
variable p=O p=l 
!'>In Yt -4.8 -4.9 
!'>In (L/Y,) -36 -31 
!'>In (K,JY,J -43 -43 
!'>In (PK,/Yt) -4.4 -4.7 
p 
N.B. - Null hypothesis: p = 1 in xt = pxt-l + I: {36.xt . +e , where x refers to the 
i= 1 -i xt 
variables in the first column 
Table 2 - Testing for Cointegration 
variable p=l p=2 p=3 p=4 
'yt -2.8 -2.1 -2.2 -1.9 
rlt , -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.5 
'kt -1.9 -1.6 -1.6 -1.7 
'pt -1.3 --0.9 -LO --0.3 
p 
N.B. - Nuli hypothesis: p = 1 in r., = pr-, 1 + ~ {it:u . . +e., with j=y, 1, k, pk. J J - i= 1 Jt-1 Jt 
31 
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Appendix 
Table A.1-Data Set for the United Sta.tes far the Period 1956--1989 
Year Output. Labor Capital Public Capital 
Table 3 - Summa.ry of Statistics for the Residuals oí the Estimated Model 
1956 1246.8 5781.6 23819 1130.6 
1957 1263.4 5779.3 2454.9 1175.6 
* * * * 
ªyt ªlt ªkt ªpt 
1958 1248.2 5576.l 25052 1224.7 
1959 1325.2 5755.l 2565.1 1275.5 
1960 1352.8 5818.5 2627.9 1327.6 
1961 1387.4 5756.2 26886 1381.4 
mean .0012 .0006 .0001 .0000 1962 1464.2 5840.0 2757 6 1436.8 1963 1524.9 5880.4 2831.8 1497.4 
standard-deviation (%) 2.11 1.65 .37 .18 1964 1608.6 5995.6 2922.0 1564.1 1965 1703.3 6173.9 3042.2 1633.8 
autocorrelation function 1966 1799.6 6365.5 3177.0 1706.8 1967 1844.7 6393.0 3306.9 1783.0 
lst lag .06 -.09 -.18 -17 1968 1921.7 6546.0 3444.4 1859.3 1969 1967.2 6755.8 3595.4 1929.8 
2nd lag .01 -.10 -.13 18 1970 1953.6 6751.5 3737.8 
1994.0 
1971 2009.6 6757.0 3871 o 2057.6 
3rd lag -.10 .02 .05 .21 1972 2113.4 69702 4015.8 2121.0 1973 2229.l 7253.0 4197.6 2180.4 
4th lag -.18 -.08 .09 -.07 1974 2207.0 7382.3 4377.9 2240.1 1975 2165.5 7185.3 4513.3 2295.l 
Box-Pierce Q(4) test 1.45 82 1.9 37 1976 2281.8 74086 4649.3 2344.1 1977 2397.0 7723.l 4813.8 2388.0 
ARCH x2(3) test 1.2 49 1.86 2.27 1978 2528.8 8131.0 5009.4 2440.4 1979 2593.6 8447.2 5222.7 2482.5 
Jarque--Bera x2(2) test 4.8 3.4 1.6 .83 1980 2583.2 8495.3 5420.0 2530.0 1981 2643.5 8598.5 56245 2571.0 
1982 2572.0 8479.8 5785.7 2606.2 
1983 2674.4 8564.8 5932 7 2644.0 
N.B. - :1: 2/,/32::: * .35 1984 2873.9 8990.5 6127.5 2682.0 1985 2973.5 92406 6348.3 2727.9 
1986 3058.0 9413.3 6545.8 2772.9 
1987 3167.8 9685 5 6731.5 2824.2 
1988 3316.7 10009. 7 6947.9 2875.2 
1989 3400.8 10262 6 7158.2 2929.2 
Urúts: priyate output, capital> and public capital - billion of 1982 dollars 
labor - ten-thousand workers; 
Sources: priva.te output, capital, and labor - OECD's Analytical Data Base 
public capiLal - OECD's Flows and Stocks of Fi~ed Capital 
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